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THE HERMENEUTIC FUNCTION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT*
Peter Knauer

of double effect leads a marginal existence in the handbooks
of moral theology and appears useful only in making possible a species of
hairsplitting. It is, in reality, the fundamental principle of all morality. It
responds to the question whether the causing or permitting of an injury is
morally evil. I speak of its hermeneutic function because the principle of
double effect enables one to grasp - much more effectively than usually
happens in traditional ethics- the meaning of the fundamental concepts
of traditional morality in their interrelation in the tradition itself.
THE PRINCIPLE

I.

PRESUPPOSITIONS

How DOES man recognize whether an act is morally good? Traditionally,
the morally good has been determined in three distinct ways: Either it is
that which "orders man to his last end, that is, God." Or it is that which
"corresponds to human nature." Or it is "the simply good."
The first definition is pious but it remains, in the final analysis, abstract.
It does not say what concrete acts are ordered to God. In reality an ordering
to God is recognized when an act is seen as morally good in itself. This
logical order is not convertible. Moreover, it may be asked whether man
acts directly in relation to God.
The second definition, requiring "correspondence to human nature," is
more concrete. But this formula gives a reasonable meaning only if human
nature is defined as "openness to reality in general." Taken rigorously, the
correspondence required is not to particular human nature but to the whole
of reality.' But the formula remains still ambiguous. It does not yet reflect
the distinction between physical and moral evil. In fact, a physical evil, such
* The first form of this essay appeared in 87 NOUVELLE REVUE THiOLOGIQUE 356-76
(1965): La dtermination du bien tt du mal moral par le principe du double effet. In
15 THEOLOGY DIGEST 100-105 (1967), a resum6 was published as "The Principle of the
Double Effect." The present text represents a further reworking of my article, Das
rechtverstandene Prinzip von der Doppelwirkung als Grundnorm jeder Gewissensentscheidung, 57 THEOLOGIE UND GLAUBE 107-33 (1967). The final text has been translated
from the German by John T. Noonan, Jr.
1 The concept of nature in ethics does not mean a discoverable and unchangeable
particular nature-for example, the nature of man in contrast to that of horses; but
according to its origin in Greek philosophy, the concept is a counterconcept to positive
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as a sickness or an error or any injury, is not yet in contradiction to nature
in a moral sense; such an evil is not a moral evil, even if moral evil is definable
only in relation to it.
The most exact is the third definition, according to which the morally
good is "the simply good." By "good" is here meant nothing other than the
physical goodness of any reality whatsoever, that goodness by which something becomes desirable in any sense, according to the axiom ens et bonum
convertuntur. What is "simply" good, and therefore morally good, is such a
value, if it is willed in such a way that the physical evil possibly associated
with it remains objectively beyond the intention of the person willing. Then
the good alone, that is, "the simply good," determines the intention.
What is physical evil is known by everyone from experience. Sickness
or error or other destruction is never willed for itself but only on account of
some other associated good. The question is whether, by reason of this good,
the permission or causing of the evil is justified or not. The unjustified permission or causing of evil signifies simply that the evil itself is also intended;
then, by intention, the act becomes morally evil.
The principle of double effect, rightly understood, responds to the question
whether in a given case the permission or causing of evil is justified or not.
In answering this question it reveals itself as a principle which provides the
criterion for every moral judgment.
Moral evil, I contend, consists in the last analysis in the permission or
causing of a physical evil which is not justified by a commensurate reason.
Not every permission or causing of physical evil is a moral evil, but every
moral evil depends on the permission or causing of physical evil. This relation,
of course, as far as cooperation in the sins of others is concerned, is direct.
It is essential now to come to a more exact understanding of the proper
meaning in ethics of "commensurate reason."
II.

AN OLD FORMULATION AND A MODERN ONE

1. THE PRINCIPLE of double effect appears to have been first formulated by
Thomas Aquinas. 2 He argues for the permissibility of self-defense by force
in the following way:
human determination (thus physis is opposition to thesis). It is a: human determination
that traffic should not move on the left but on the right. This arbitrary determination
stems from a necessity arising from "nature" that for the safety of participants in traffic
some fixed order be determined. Cf. for the concept of the law of nature- the very
perceptive article of P. Antoine, Conscience et loi naturelle, 317 ETUDES 162-83 (1963).
2 Cf. J. T. Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 41-61 (1949).
There is no substantial foundation for the criticism ot
Mangan's conclusions by J. Ghoos, L'Acte h double effet-Etude de thiologie positive 27
EPHEMERIDES THEOLOGICAE LOVANIENSES 30-52 (esp. p. 31f.) (1951).
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I reply that it must be said that nothing prevents there being two
effects of one act, of which one effect alone would be in the intention
and the other would be beyond intention. But moral acts receive their
species according to what is intended, not from what is beyond intention,
since the latter is accidental as appears from what has been said above.
Therefore, from the- act of someone defending himself a double effect
can follow: one is the preservation of his own life, the other is the killing
of the attacker. An act of this kind in which the preservation of one's
own life is intended does not have the character of the unlawful, since
it is natural for everyone to preserve himself in his being as far as he can.
But some act arising from a good intention can be made unlawful
if it is not proportionate to the end. And so, if someone in defending his
own life uses greater violence than is necessary, it will be unlawful. But
3
if he moderately repels violence, it will be a lawful defense.
It must first be noted that the concept of "effect" is not used here as a
correlative to "cause," but in a more general sense; "aspect" might be a
more exact term. It is evident that the good effect of the act in this example
is itself the internal object of the act; the effect here is not different from this
object as elsewhere the effect from its cause.
In the interpretation of the text it is also important to pay attention to the
third paragraph, where in reality the only one possibility of a moral offense is
noted. Thomas does not use the criterion of "correspondence to nature." The
approach taken is this: In sinning, man seeks a real good, but his act in its
total existential entirety is not proportioned to this good. Then the evil arising
thereby, whether it is desired or not, belongs objectively to the act and is
objectively what is "intended."
In the text of Thomas the expression "what is intended" provides the most
matter for consideration. The concept of intention in ethics evidently means
something different from what it means in psychology. In ethics an injury
can be "intended" even if the person acting would have preferred its absence
or was not thinking much about it. Conversely, as in the killing of an aggressor,
'an effect can be beyond moral intention, although the person acting was
psychologically concentrated on it.

3 THOMAS

AQUINAS,

SUMMA

THEOLOGIAE,

II-I,

q. 6 4 , a.7 in corpore:

Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum
alter solum sit in intentione, alius vero sit praeter intentionem. Morales autem actus

recipiunt speciem secundum id quod intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter
intentionem, cum sit per accidens, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ex actu igitur alicuius
seipsum defendentis duplex effectus sequi potest: unus quidem conservatio propriae
vitae; alius autem occisio invadentis. Actus igitur huiusmodi ex hoc quod intenditur
conservatio propriae vitae, non habet rationem illiciti: cum hoc sit cuilibet naturale
quod se conservet

in

esse

quantum

potest.

Potest

tamen

aliquis actus

ex bona

intentione proveniens illicitus reddi si non sit proportionatus fini. Et ideo si aliquis
ad defendendum propriam vitam utatur maiori violentia quam oporteat, erit illicitum.
Si vero moderate violentiam repellat, erit licita defensio.
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Several other relevant points should be observed in reference to the traditional teaching on "the sources of morality" (tontes moralitatis). According
to what St. Thomas says elsewhere, moral acts are "determined" by the end
of the act, by the finis operis.4 In the present text he says that moral acts are
determined by "what is intended." At first glance it seems surprising to say
that what must be meant here is not the "end of the person acting" (finis
operantis) but the "end of the work" (finis operis). Yet in order to avoid
contradiction with the passages elsewhere, the "end of the act" must mean
"what is intended." What results from taking this approach?
By finis operis there should not be understood - as unfortunately often
happens - only the external effect, the effect that could be photographed.
In ethics, finis operis means the act which is willed and intended as such. The'
classic example in the manuals runs as follows: Someone giving alms has as
finis operis the relief of the needs of a poor man. 5 But almsgiving is not
merely a physical act. It becomes a moral act through the intention of the
donor. The external action consists in money going from one hand to another.
Is this action payment for a purchase or the giving of a present? Is it money
lent to the other? Is it the repayment of a debt? Is it a bribe? Whatever in
fact the action is depends on what the person transferring the money wills the
action objectively to be. That is not a matter of his arbitrary declaration but
of his actual intent. All physical evils which are not justified, and which
arise in the pursuit of a value, are in the moral sense eo ipso morally intended
and belong to the finis operis itself.
The finis operantis, which is regarded as a second "source of morality,"
is not to be identified merely with the moral intention of the person acting
By finis operantis, the external end, there is meant the act towards which
the person acting relates his first action. Thus someone may give alms in order
to obtain a tax advantage. The finis operantis of the first act is related to,
4

Id.

at I-HIe, q.1, a.3-;q.18, a.2-7. The finis operis is identical with the moral object

of an act.
5 E.g., M. ZALBA, I THEOLOOrAE MORALIS COM-PENDIUM (Madrid,

1958), n. 10: "Finis
. . . dividitur in: a) OPERIS (intrinsecum), ad quem res vel actio objective ex natura
sua ordinatur (obiectum morale actionis) in morali hominum existimatione; . . . Sic
eleemosyna ordinatur ex se ad subveniendum pauperi." See also A. VERMEERSCH, I
THEOLOG I
i ORALIS PRINCIPIA-RESPONSA---CONSILIA
(Rome,- 1926), n. 115: "Finis est
id propter quod aliquid fit. Rationem autem agendi habere, proprium est entis rationalis.
Quare finis dicitur primus in intentione; nihil magis voluntarium est, ac proin nihil magis
morale. Finis operis seu internus, intrinsecus dicitur, ad quem opus per se, seu natura
sua in morali existimatione tendit, ut v.g. internus finis eleemosynae est levamen indigentiae." The moralis existimatio commonly spoken of by moralists in their definition of

finis operis does not mean a kind of vague judgment according to common sense, but a
moral judgment of. the act-a judgment which includes a reference to .the intention and
thereby an implicit application of the principle of double effect as it has been above
interpreted.
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and is indeed identical with, the finis operis of this second act. If someone
performs a single act without relating it to another act, he has only a finis
operis of his act, and, to speak exactly, there is no finis operantis.6
In addition to the finis operis and the finis operantis, another traditional
source of morality is the circumstances of an act. Their only function is to determine the act quantitatively. A theft is a theft according to the finis operis
whether the amount stolen is large or small; but the gravity of the offense depends on the amount. If the theft is connected with breaking and entering,
then this fact is not the addition of another circumstance but a change in the
7
finis operis itself.
The division of finis operis and finis operantis into an external physical
act and an internal intention cannot be maintained in one and the same
act; this is an arbitrary distinction arising on Cartesian foundations. Neither
the pure external happening nor the psychological intention is morally understandable alone; only the objective relation, in which both have a part, is
understandable. This conclusion means that the moral species of the finis operis
depends on whether this relation is one of correspondence or one of final contradiction, while the finis operantis relates to the finis operis of another act.
For the time being I will rest with this formal definition of finis in ethics;
at a later point I shall return to the topic to give a more exact definition.
2. Today the principle of double effect is most briefly formulated as
follows:•
One may permit the evil effect of his act only if this is not intended
in itself but is indirect and justified by a commensurate reason.
The modem formula seems to be different in more than one respect from
that of St. Thomas. He required the act to correspond to its end (actus sit
proportionatusfini). The present formula speaks of a "commensurate reason"
(ratio proportionata). The principle of double effect is, I believe, rightly
understood if it is recognized that in fact both requirements mean the same
thing.
Thomas also held that the evil might not be effected directly. According
to him, the intention must be accidental (per accidens); it must be beyond
intention (praeter intentionem). The usual explanation of this terminology
G Cf. A. van Rijen, Daden met meerdere gevolgen en de leer over de bronnen der
zedelijkheid, in JAARBOEK 1960 VAN HET WERKOENOOTSCHA" vAN KATH. THEOL. IN
NEDERLAND 48-82 (esp. p. 70) (Hilversum, 1961); similarly, F. D'Hoogh, Over de
afzonderlijke zedelijke handeling, 50 COLLECTANZA MECHUNENSiA 336-53; 476-96
(especially p. 486) '(1965), which refers to my first article cited in the asterisked footnote.
7 Cf. THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 3, at I-Il, q.18, a.10; q.88, a.5.
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understands the pair of concepts, "direct- indirect," in the sense of direct
or indirect physical causality; but this explanation is questionable. I
say that an evil effect is not "directly intended" only if there is
a "commensurate ground" for its permission or causation. There are not
two distinct requirements when I speak of the "indirect causing" of evil and
of "a commensurate reason" for the act. The principle may be adequately
formulated as follows: One may permit the evil effect of his act only if he
has a commensurate reason for it.
The objectivity of all ethics depends on the determination of commensurate. A "commensurate reason" is not an arbitrary X, equivalent to "serious
reason in the circumstances." The customary deformed understanding of
this concept identifies "commensurate" with "serious"; from this deformation,
an unhealthy confusion in ethics has resulted. These observations must suffice for now; I shall return later to attempt further clarification.
III.

THE SAME PRINCIPLE IN A VARIETY OF EXPRESSIONS

concept in the modem formulation of the principle of double effect
is the requirement of a "commensurate reason." This concept can be found
in various other chapters of traditional ethics: "Cooperation in the Sin of
Another," "Intrinsic Malice and Extrinsic Malice," "Affirmative and Negative
Laws of Nature." In scholastic ethics all of these articles were put in different
drawers. But in each there is rediscovered the structure of the principle of
double effect: the causing or permitting of a physical evil is morally permitted because of a commensurate reason; without a commensurate reason
the act is morally evil.
1. "Formal" cooperation in the sin of another is absolutely forbidden in
every case. "Material" cooperation is permitted if there is a commensurate
reason. 8 If a commensurate reason is lacking, material cooperation in the sin
of another becomes formal and therefore forbidden. The absence of a commensurate reason is decisive.
It is evident that the permission or causing of evil on behalf of another
becomes moral evil only through the application of the principle 0f double
THE KEY

8 Here

it

must be observed

that the

pair of concepts,

"formal"-"material,"

in

the

teaching on cooperation with evil is used in a different sense than in the distinction made
between "formal" and "material" sin. In a material sin the person acting is in good faith
as to the objective permissibility of what he does. For example, he gives his friend candy
when in reality it is poison. In formal sin there is complete consciousness of the actual
character of transgression in the act, and therefore the person acting is guilty. In the
sense in which the terms are used in reference to cooperation, there can be complete
consciousness of what one is doing and nonetheless the act may be material cooperation
and not formal cooperation.
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effect. If I have a commensurate reason for permitting or cooperating with
the evil, the evil remains indirect for me. I only participate materially therein,
while the formal content of my act is distinct from the evil, so that my act in reality is good. But if my act lacks a commensurate reason, I directly and formally
cause or permit evil on behalf of another and become guilty myself. In short,
the pair of concepts, "formal" - "material," as they are used in the teaching
on cooperation in the sin of another, are fundamentally the same as "direct"
and "indirect" in the modern formulation of the principle of double effect.
2. There is a way of acting, which, according to the common teaching, is
"intrinsically" evil and therefore universally forbidden. Other ways of acting.
are only "extrinsically" evil and therefore permitted in the presence of commensurate reasons. But if there is no commensurate reason, then they also
are absolutely forbidden in every case. This teaching means, I maintain, that
then they are "intrinsically" evil. What is intrinsically an evil act is brought
about when no commensurate reason can justify the permission or causing
of the extrinsic evil, that is, any given premoral physical evil or injury. This is
a thesis which has special significance for contemporary ethics. It says that
"morally evil" and "intrinsically evil" are synonymous expressions.
Yet, are there not acts which universally are intrinsically evil so that the
question of whether there is a commensurate reason or not is simply superfluous? For example, is not murder under all circumstances forbidden? Such
a judgment of universal condemnation is only reached by an implicit application of the principle of double effect. As long as an act is judged according
to its external appearance and independently of the character of its reason,
it is not understandable as a human act; it is not something that can yet
be judged morally. Once it is determined whether or not the reason for an
act is commensurate, the moral species of the act may be determined. Murder,
for example, consists by definition in causing the death of a man without a
commensurate ground. If the same external act, such as causing of the death
of a man, has a commensurate ground, then it is from the beginning an act
morally different from murder - either self-defense or a lawful act of justice
in order to protect the community.
Again, the . same conclusion is reached: The terms examined are contained in the principle of double effect. The pair of concepts, "intrinsic extrinsic," signify the same thing as "direct" and "indirect" in the formulation
of the principle.
There are further pairs of concepts which also stand in the same relation to
the requirement of a commensurate reason. There are, for example, per se per accidens and "in intention" - "beyond intention" in the text cited from
St. Thomas. The use of these different concepts for one and the same reality
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reveals that the scholastics had not reflected thoroughly enough on their
meanings.
3. Especially instructive is a comparison of the principle of double effect
with the traditional teaching's distinction between affirmative and negative
laws of nature.
Negative laws (for example, "You shall not murder," "You shall not
lie") oblige, as the manuals say, "always and everywhere." They permit no
exceptions but are universally valid.
There are, however, affirmative laws corresponding to the negative laws.
For example, corresponding to the instances given above, these are, "You shall
revere and protect human life," "You shall speak the truth." In contrast to
the negative obligations these affirmative laws only oblige "semper, sed non pro
semper." A commensurate reason justifies the nonobservance of such laws.
If a commensurate reason is lacking, however, no justification is possible.
In such a case the affirmative law becomes absolute, "semper et pro semper,"
exactly like the negative law.
The negative law, in fact, is already contained in the affirmative. The
negative law is only the application of the affirmative in cases in which there
is no commensurate reason excusing from nonobservance. The pure nonobservance of the affirmative law is already identical with active infraction
of its negative form. A permission of evil which is not justified by a commensurate reason amounts morally to positively causing it. The physical distinction between these cases is very secondary for moral judgment. It is only
the more exact specification of the behavior which depends on this ground for example, when we want to distinguish between homicide and murder.
But the affirmative laws go further than the negative laws in their power
of obligation. The sphere where their application is unconditioned is identical
with that of the negative laws, which must always be observed if there is a
lack of commensurate reason. The "semper" of the affirmative laws is to
be observed without restriction. But attention is to be given them even when
a commensurate reason permits their present nonobservance.
What do I mean by this? I will give a medical decision as an example.
There is a therapy against cancer based on present knowledge of the cells, a
therapy which produces disturbances in the blood. To cause such disturbance
without commensurate reason would be an injury to the health of the patient
and so an intrinsically evil violation of negative law. But if such therapy
holds the promise of improvement in the total health of the patient, the
physician permissibly accepts in exchange the unavoidable evils which accompany it. He has a commensurate reason which makes "indirect" his
action of causing an evil. His act is a justified nonobservance of the affirmative
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law which demands that he have care for the healthy state of blood in his
patient. This value in his work evidently manifests an affirmative law corresponding to the negative law, but going beyond it.9 If the physician is
dispensed from the direct observance of the affirmative law, it remains valid,
and he may not content himself forever with the necessity which forced it not to
be observed. He is obliged to seek better solutions. In this obligation the
meaning of the affirmative law controls the negative. If a better therapy is
developed, what has been permitted can no longer be applied.
This example also shows explicitly what in ethics is unchangeable natural
law. In ethics, only the obligation to seek the best possible solutions in their
total existential entirety is unchangeable. The best solutions cannot be determined in advance as in a catalogue; they must be developed within the
dynamic of the affirmative obligation that there be development. In this
development only the prohibition of direct permission or causing of evil is
unchangeable.
Negative and affirmative precepts thus constitute still another area ruled
by the principle of double effect. To the negative law there corresponds the
absolute prohibition of directly causing or permitting evil in any way. To
cause or permit evil indirectly is like the nonobservance of an affirmative law
where this nonobservance is justified by a commensurate reason. A commensurate reason would evidently be the observance of another, more compelling affirmative law which in existing conditions could not be observed at the same
time as the first law. The obligation would remain to seek the possibility of
being able to observe both laws. In the principle of double effect there is
a commitment to advance in all the interrelated areas of reality. 1°
IV.

WHAT IS A COMMENSURATE REASON?

I 1AVE indicated that the expression "commensurate reason" determines the
meaning of all the other concepts. Through lack of a commensurate reason
material cooperation in sin becomes formal; extrinsic malice becomes intrinsic malice; affirmative law takes the shape of an unconditional negative.
The principle of double effect means that to cause or permit an evil without
9If the principle of double effect appears purely formal in its nature and requires for
the morality of an act only the presence of a commensurate reason which then makes
indirect the evil accepted in exchange, yet the principle contains a content determined by
ontology. Any reason whatsoever may be the reason for an act, and yet one may not
conclude that any reason is in fact commensurate to the act. Conversely, the question what
is evil may also be answered from ontology: it is the-lack of completeness which could be
present.
'('Cf. L. Janssens, Daden met meerdere gevolgen, 32
621-33 (esp. p. 632) (1947).
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commensurate reason is a morally bad act. The evil is no longer accidental
in the intention of the person acting, but it becomes constitutive of the moral
content of the act, the finis operis, or internal object. If a commensurate
reason is present, the permission or causing of the evil becomes indirect and
is objectively no longer the object of moral intention. The commensurate
reason occupies the same area as what is directly willed and alone determines
the entire moral content of the act. If the reason of an act is commensurate,
it alone determines the finis operis, so that the act is morally good. The permission or causing of a physical evil is indirect or direct as there is or is not
present a commensurate reason. Self-defense is a good example. The external
operations are the same as those of a murder, for there is a use of deadly
weapons. The moral distinction is recognized only when the unavoidable
death of the attacker has a commensurate reason in self-defense. The object
of the act is then the commensurate reason which consists in the preservation
of one's own life against attack.
But when is the reason for an act a commensurate reason? There is a
reason for every act even if it is morally evil. One can only will something
on the condition that he is able to see a value in it in some aspect. The freedom of the will is grounded in this fact. Because the will by its nature is
directed to the good as such, it can either will a good positively insofar
as it is good or reject it insofar as it is only one good and not simply the good.
The possibility of both decisions is based on the same judgment according to
which the object is really a (but not the) good. 1
Thus the reason for each act is an actual good. A thief steals only because
he hopes for a use from the money. Even the one who acts from pure hate
against the moral law seeks an actual value, although in a mistaken way. In his
existential decision he wills to determine himself. But does he reach in this way
what makes the freedom worth striving for?
For an act to be morally good it is not enough that it always seek a value

11 The postulation of a necessary judicium ultimo-practicum, as it is commonly assumed
by the scholastics, would contradict freedom and in the last analysis make its rational explanation impossible. It is a false assumption that the fundamental form of free choice
is the possibility of decision between several goods, among which one chooses that good
which reason, working reciprocally with the will, declares to.be the greatest. This explanation contains a logical circle which is disguised with difficulty. In reality there is a libertas
specificationis not only when one compares several objects with one -another, but also
when one accepts or rejects a single good in itself. The first form, that is, libertas
specificationis inter plura, is then only a conclusory application of the second libertas
specificationis quoad idem. A No is naturally more than the pure preservation of an
act of the will on the basis of a so-called libertas exercitii which under no circumstances
can be designated as the fundamental form of the freedom of the will. I make this
observation only because I know of no other satisfactory explanation of the freedom of the
will in scholasticism.
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and so always have a reason. What is required is that this reason be commensurate. What does this mean? "Commensurate" to what?
This question is commonly answered in this way: The good achieved
must correspond to the evil accepted in exchange, and indeed the good must
outweigh the evil. But this answer is no advance. Such a quantitative comparison is not possible, as it is a matter of qualitatively different values which
cannot be compared with one another. When some years ago in Germany
the speed limit in city traffic was experimentally abolished, the death toll
in traffic accidents rose threefold, and therefore the fifty-kilometer limit was very
soon restored; but the death toll was still quite high. Could the loss in human
life be compared with the advantages which a speedier traffic system brings?
The different values which are measurable by themselves are incommensurable
with each other. There is no common measure for them.
A comparison becomes possible if it is established what function one value
has for another. A faster traffic causes a loss of more human lives. But if
there were no traffic, the preservation of life as a whole surely would not
be greater. The preservation of life in great part depends on a sound economy,
which, in turn, today depends on the fastest possible traffic. Thus the complete throttling of traffic would not serve the preservation of human life as
a whole. By this standard, this end would not be a commensurate reason.
At the same time, faster traffic is a greater good the more it is accompanied
by safety. This valuation rests on the foundation that the value sought is
commensurate when it is achieved in the highest possible measure for the
whole.
The example of traffic is instructive in another aspect. Speed limits,
regulation of automobiles, and other limits on the freedom of individuals
serve, in fact to produce faster traffic and greater safety in relation to the
whole. The limitations of freedom directly serve to achieve the greatest possible freedom for the whole. The violator of traffic rules contradicts the value
as a whole which he wishes to realize for himself. There is a contradiction
between his deed and its foundation.
A student may desire to learn the most possible. He can be successful in this pursuit only if he interrupts his work from time to time.
If he is so bent on his objective of learning that he injures his own health,
perhaps for a short time he may achieve something above average but the
result on the whole will be less. In an extreme case he becomes sick
from overwork and cannot accomplish anything. Then in the last analysis he
contradicts his own purpose. Something similar happens in any immoral act.
An objective is sought which has an appropriate price (tantum-quantum),
but it is sought at any price. In unmeasured desire there is sacrificed what
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alone would assure the greatest possible achievement of the end.
The government of a developing country has a plan to better the living
standard of its people. This objective may be reached only through an ongoing industrialization which requires an extensive renunciation of immediate
accomplishments. If, instead of such a program, the administration forces
immediate sharing of goods by use of the police, it may indeed achieve an
elevation of the living standard. But this approach quickly leads to a destruction of the economy, and the need becomes greater than before. In seeking
an immediate achievement of the objective there has been a neglect of the
total conditions of possibility and thereby a contradiction of the objective
itself. In this example there is especially clear what could be called the feedback effect or the reciprocal function of two values. On one hand, a rise in
the living standard requires industrialization. Industrialization is not a higher
value than a, better living standard - the possibility of such a comparison
has already been denied - but industrialization is of the greatest urgency
if a higher living standard is to be achieved. On the other hand, industrialization cannot be achieved if at the same time there is not at least some beginning
of a rise in the living standard, because no industry can be developed with
hungry workers.
All of these examples may illustrate that unintelligent and therefore immoral acts are in the last analysis self-contradictions and consist in unmeasured
desire taking the fruit from the tree before it is ripe. There is an isolation of
the objective from its proper conditions. A good is sought while the conditions for. the highest possible realization of the good are abandoned. This
state of affairs is described by the language of the old moral theology when
it singles out an immoral act as an act against nature, contra naturam. There
is a destruction of reality itself when part of reality is isolated from its interrelations. If someone pays a price for a good which is not commensurate
with the good but, rather, contradicts it and makes the highest possible achievement of the good as a whole impossible, he irresponsibly causes injury. When
the expression contra naturam is used in ethics, there is not meant physical
evil which is against nature only in a premoral, physical sense. What is meant
is a physical evil caused or permitted without commensurate reason - that
is, in this act there is a long-run contradiction in reality between the value
sought and the way of achieving it.
Immediately in the short run there may often be a remarkable achievement. Irrationality first emerges when consideration is given to all the
interrelationships and when it is asked if the objective existentially achieved,
seen in terms of the whole, best corresponds not only to a particular person
but to the totality. What this distinction between individual and totality
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means may be clarified by the example given above of freedom in traffic. The
moral consciousness poses this universalizing question. The distinction between the two approaches is rigorously objective. Whether a reason for an act
is commensurate or not is beyond all subjective arbitrariness. 1 2 The reason
for an act is not a commensurate reason if there is a contradiction in the last
analysis between the act and the reason.
A similar result is reached if the modem formulation of the principle of
double effect is compared with the formulation of St. Thomas. As I noted
earlier, Thomas instead of requiring a commensurate reason (ratio proportionata) says that the entire act must correspond to its end (actus sit proportionatus fini); but end means nothing other than reason for the act. It is simply a
matter of a correspondence between the act and its proper reason. Both requirements, that the reason for an act be commensurate (that is, that it be one
commensurate to the act itself) or that the act must correspond to its reason,
mean the same. An act becomes immoral when it is contradictory to the fullest
achievement of its own end in relation to the whole of reality. A short-run
"more" of the value is paid by a "lesser" achievement of the same value in
the long run.

V.

THREE DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF

"EN"

So FAR I have used the expression "end" (for which "intention" could be
substituted) in an entirely specific sense as identical with reason. It is important to note this in order to avoid an easy misunderstanding. "End" can
also have another meaning and simply signify a determinate concrete fact.
Thus a band of bank robbers has the end of entering the treasury of a bank.
It would be absurd to measure the morality of this act by asking if
the band is using the most appropriate means of achieving its end. Such a
determination is not meant when I speak of the correspondence required
12 R. A. McCormick, Notes on Moral Theology, 26 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 603-608 (1965)
has raised as an objection to my French article mentioned at the beginning of the notes
that my explanation of the principle of double effect transgresses the boundaries of an
objective ethics. Unfortunately in his account of my work he first confuses "commensurate
reason" with any reason ("The formality under which the act is willed is determined by the
proportionate reason for acting," p. 604) and then confuses it with a "reason proportionate
to the original goal" (p. 604) ; and he appears to conclude, contrary to my express statement,
that any direct quantitative comparison of one value with another value may create a commensurate reason (p. 606). Above all McCormick objects that I failed to distinguish in my
article between "inner" and "outer" "commensurate reasons." In reality I had set out this
distinction on pages 360-61 as the distinction between finis operis and finis operantis. I return
to it in Part VII of the present paper. His chief objection is that "this reasoning would destroy the concept of that which is intrinsically evil ex obiecto" (p. 605). What I have said
in Part 111.2 above is a response to this objection. What was lacking in my French article
was a failure to make explicit the identity of the morally evil and the intrinsically evil, that
is, the evil ex obiecto. On this account I am grateful to McCormick for his criticism.
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between the act and its proper end. In this requirement what is meant by
end is not a concrete fact but what in a particular fact makes it worth
acting for, its ratio boni. In the sense I use it, in which the end of an act
is identical with its reason, it must be said that the value the robber band is
seeking is to become rich. At this level the question is posed whether breaking
and entering leads in the long run to the greatest realization of riches as a
whole or whether it is in contradiction to such realization.
If end is used as identical with reason, it is still not a concept of ethics.
As I have already shown, both good and bad acts have a reason in this sense,
as reason means a value. The reason of the worst act is never an evil but
always a good, that is, something in fact worth striving for. Therefore, a
source of morality is not reached when reason or end in this sense is reached.
In a moral sense the end of an act is what is "intended" - the finis operis
and, eventually more broadly, the finis operantis, the ordering of the act to
the finis operis of a more comprehensive act. These expressions signify the
reason of the act insofar as it is in correspondence with the totality of the
act or not. In this moral sense, the reason is no longer considered alone but
in its relation to the act itself. If the reason of an act is a commensurate
reason, it is in a moral sense the end of the act and intended. It is then
completely identical with the finis operis, so that the eventual concomitant
evil, even if it is considered necessarily part of the exchange, falls outside the
finis operis. The finis operis of the act is, then, simply good.
When the reason of an act is not a commensurate reason so that between
it and the act in terms of the horizon of the whole reality there is a contradiction, the reason in itself may be as good and as important as possible, yet the
finis operis of the act is no longer constituted by this reason; the reason is in
contradiction to the act, and the finis operis is constituted by the evil effect
which accompanies it. In the example of bank robbery, the chief evil effect
is the harming of other people in the taking of their property. This harm is
intended in the moral sense in a bank robbery, although the gangsters have
only their own enrichment in view.
In Part VIII I shall return to the threefold meaning of the concept of
end in a discussion of the distinction between mutilation and medically necessary amputation.

VI.

THE MORAL GOOD AS THE BEST POSSIBLE

EVERY human act brings evil effects with it. The choice of a value always
means concretely that there is denial of another value which must be given
as a price in exchange. If the chosen value is sought in its entirety in a com-
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mensurate way, the evil falls outside what is directly willed. In other cases when
the reason of the act is not commensurate, the evils which arise are themselves directly willed even"if they are not in the least desired in themselves.
I shall seek to make the matter still clearer through the development of
a statement of Aristotelian ethic. I refer to an easily understood alternative
to the scholastic procedure. According to Aristotle, morally right behavior is a mean between two extremes which can be recognized as too much
or too little. It is observed that in consideration of the good, the mean itself is
an extreme. 1 3 Thus, for example, bravery is a mean between foolhardiness
and cowardice. Aristotle declared that bravery appears more closely related to
one of the two extremes, foolhardiness. This observation, which is made by
Aristotle himself with some surprise, provides an opportunity for asking
whether there is not also a name for right behavior which appears to lie closer
to cowardice, the other false extreme. There is, in fact, prudence. It belongs
inseparably with bravery. It is clear to everyone that bravery without prudence is in reality not bravery but foolhardiness; prudence without bravery
is in reality only cowardice. If foolhardiness consists in too great a risk so
that in the end too little is achieved, bravery consists in achieving the most
possible of that for which the entire risk is undertaken. Again, there is the
criterion of commensurate reason; that is, of a proportionality of the act to
its proper objective. Bravery is readiness for any risk which is justified by
the end in its existential entirety. Bravery is thus accompanied by prudence,
which holds the risk to the smallest degree possible so that the greatest possible
gain may be achieved. Cowardice lacks this measure. It wagers the least,
but thereby loses too much of the whole.
The formal structure of winning and losing which is implied in this
example is founded on the principle of double effect. Evil may be accepted
in exchange if, in relation to the whole, the smallest possible evil is exchanged
for the highest possible gain. The whole is the determinative point of view
for morality; it distinguishes ethics from a technique based on experience in
a particular area. When an act neither sacrifices too much nor gains too little,
there is conduct which is commensurate to the end sought. Immoral acts consist in preferring the success of the moment to true gain and thereby spoiling the
achievement of true gain in the act which is carried out. A coward naturally
always says that he is prudent, and a fool often holds himself to be brave.
They both refer to their good intentions, but they are both unmasked when
consideration is given to the complementary virtue. Where is the bravery in
the pretended prudence of a coward? Where is the prudence in the asserted
13 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
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bravery of the fool? In the presence of the complementary virtue there is
recognized that the act has a commensurate reason; that is, it is recognized
that the act is in proportion to its end. Liberality accompanied by economy
is distinguished from extravagance; economy is only avarice unless it is
liberal. Progress is not a pure seeking of what is new but a preservation
of what is good in the old; there is in fidelity to tradition only a spiritless
severity unless it fosters the creation of the new. Zeal and discretion go together; otherwise zeal in reality becomes fanaticism, and instead of discretion
there is mediocrity. "Be wise as the serpent and simple as the dove" (Matthew
10.16). Such a demand is not paradoxical but excludes slyness and stupidity
together. Christian hope works out its salvation "in fear and trembling"
(Philip. 2.12) ; one without the other is either presumption or despair. There
are many other examples. This square is of universal applicability.
Moral good consists in the best possible realization of any particular value
envisaged in its entirety. This assertion is fundamentally different from the
rigorist thesis which says that among different goods the highest must be
always chosen. Here, rather, there is freedom as long as the particular value
chosen is not itself subverted.
A particularly good example is the problem of the vocation where the
choice has to be made between several morally good possibilities. A false
model of this choice is provided if vocation is understood as "a specific call
which God himself has implanted in me in advance." The will of God which
is knowable objectively consists in being able to decide for oneself among
different good possibilities. A so-called vocation should not be understood
objectively as an advance determination to one possibility. Vocation consists
rather in the possibility of having appropriate motives for the way to be
chosen. This is the grace of a calling. It is completely possible that someone be called in this sense to different vocations, so that he himself must make
the actual choice. Only in an unusual case where there is an extraordinary
need can there be an obligation which is binding in one direction from the
beginning; in such a case any other choice would be self-contradictory, because the other possibilities depend for their realization on a condition which
must be realized at any cost.
VII. BAD

MEANS

have given to this point of the principle of double effect
is very different from the usual explanation given in the teaching on what is
voluntarium in causa. This is usually given the following sense: If an evil
is the further physical consequence of the good which is willed, or at least does
THE EXPLANATION I
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not precede the good which is willed, then the permissibility of the act depends on what is intended by the act. If the evil permitted or caused accompanies the good to be achieved only as a consequence or a concomitant,
the act is permitted; otherwise not. But if the evil physically precedes the willed
good and so is "the means" to its achievement, then it is directly willed and
makes the entire act evil, just as if the evil was intended by the act. In this
case, the principle of double effect is replaced by another principle: A good
end does not justify bad means.
Such a contrast between these two principles involves a logical error. In
the principle that the good end does not justify the bad means it is already
assumed that the means are morally bad. 14 The principle is only applicable if
the moral judgment has already been formed; in the moral evil of the means
something new is not discovered; the evil was already established. In the
principle of double effect, in contrast, a moral judgment of this kind is in
the process of being determined. The two principles are not parallel in their
applicability. That a means is morally bad signifies in our sense that the
reason for the application of the means is not commensurate. The pure determination that the means entails physical evil is not enough to qualify it as
morally evil. It may well be that the permission or causing of this evil is
only indirect because of a commensurate reason. Provided that an end is
sought in its existential entirety in a truly commensurate way, the means
determined by this end which can contribute to the best possible realization
of the end may justify accepting physical evil in exchange. Of course, one
must be satisfied that this price is the smallest possible. In this sense the axiom
is valid: Finis determinat media.

The principle that the good end does not justify the bad means may
rightly be understood in either of the two following senses. On the one hand,
it may be a matter of a single act whose reason is a good end. The principle
asserts that this end, however serious and good in itself, cannot justify the
permission or causing of physical evil in the course of its achievement if it
is not a commensurate reason in the sense I have indicated. The act must
correspond to the value sought not only in the short ran but in its existential
entirety. On the other hand, the means may itself consist in a proper act
which can be recognized without reference to a further objective as having
a reason in itself which suffices for the positing of the act. If this reason
is not a commensurate one, then the act may not be morally saved, even if
it can be related to another act which is an achievement of an end that
in itself is good. The means in the last analysis would contradict the act.
'4

Cf. F. D'Hoogh, op. cit. supra note 6, at 487.
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In the second sense, St. Thomas says at the conclusion of his analysis of
self-defense that it is not permitted to will the death of the aggressor as an
act in itself. 15 Self-defense then would be the finis operantis and no longer the
finis operis. The death of the attacker would be willed even if it were not
determined to be necessary in fact for self-defense. Such an act would obviously
not be permissible.
But clearly there are cases in which the causing or permitting of an evil
precedes the achievement of the end without the act thereby becoming
morally bad. The evil is justified by a commensurate reason; although the
cause is physically direct, it is not direct in a moral sense. The following
example is dassic. A dangerous fortress may be made harmless only by
being stormed by force, but in the outer bastion of the fortress there are
innocent hostages who will lose their lives before the proper end of the
action, the storming of the fortress, can be achieved. In traditional ethics
this action is permissible as long as there is no other way to avoid the evil.
The decisive question is not whether the evil, the deaths of the prisoners during
the storming, follows the good which is sought or precedes it; the decisive
question is in what way the evil is willed. The act is morally bad if the evil
is direct or formal, that is, if the act is willed in such a way that there is no
commensurate reason for it and therefore is irresponsible. The purely physical
series of events is irrelevant to the moral qualification of good or bad. One and
the same means can in one aspect be a value or lead to the realization of a
value and simultaneously be a physical evil in another aspect. If there is a
commensurate reason for the permitting or causing of the evil, the means is
effectively willed only in its good aspect. The effect or, more exactly, the
aspect which is physically evil remains morally outside of what is intended.
When the categories direct and indirect are confused with purely physical
categories, a blind hairsplitting is introduced into ethics. Removal of a
cancerous uterus is permitted even though as a consequence the fetus within
the uterus loses its life. But to remove only the fetus, because the uterus may
still be healed, is said by some theologians to be murder; they think the death
of the fetus is used as a means and so is directly willed. In other words, a
solution which includes both the death of the fetus and the removal of the
entire uterus with consequent sterility is said to be better than that the fetus
alonelose its life. Who can understand this?
In the case of an ectopic pregnancy it is almost certain that the woman
together with an unborn child will die if the fetus is not removed as early as
possible. The "insight" that this is immoral is scarcely demonstrable to any
15 "...

illicitum est, quod homo intendat occidere hominem, ut seipsum defendat .... "
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doctor. It is agreed that direct killing is forbidden. But in my opinion, some
scholastic moralists have assumed incorrectly that the saving of the mother,
which in the normal case is probable if there is immediate removal of the
ectopic fetus, is a direct killing. Negative laws (You shall not kill, You shall
not speak an untruth, You shall not take the property of another) are understandable only as the prohibition of direct and therefore formal permission
or causing of these physical evils (death, error, loss of property, etc.), in cases
where by definition there is no commensurate reason. Whether there is a
violation of a commandment (that is, whether an act is murder, lying, theft)
can be ascertained only if it is established that the reason for the act in its
existential entirety is not commensurate. Without a commensurate reason
an evil is always willed directly, even if attention is not expressly directed to
the evil but it is desired that there be no such evil.
VIII.

EXCEPTIONS IN ETHICS

IN THE recent literature of moral theology there has been evoked from time
to time what is called the principle of totality, a principle contrasted with
the principle of double effect. The latter is said to relate only to the justification of the "barely permissible," while the principle of totality relates to the
"justification of an effect willed for itself by reason of its connection with the
whole order of purposes and goods."' 1 6 The principle of totality justifies an act
such as the removal of a sick organ in order to save the whole organism.
In my opinion the principle of totality is in reality not distinguishable from
the principle of double effect. The latter bears not merely on the passive
permission of an evil but relates to the most active kind of permission; concretely the act itself may cause or effect the evil; the evil is not direct unless
it is willed without commensurate reason. In fact, it is not true, for example,
that a medically necessary amputation is willed in the moral sense as a removal
of an organ. What is willed is only the removal of what is an obstacle to
health in its entirety. That this obstacle is identical with the hitherto useful
member of the body is accidental for moral judgment (existimatio moralis),1-'
because a commensurate reason justifies the acceptance of the loss. For the
eventual preservation of the organs the existence of the person itself must
certainly first be assured. There is not a quantitative relation between
a part to the whole, but a priority of dependence of one upon the other. If
there is a commensurate reason, the removal of an organ is justified, and the
18 L. Liebhart, Sterilisierende Drogen, 111 THEOL0SCH-PlAKTISCHE QUARTALSCHRI-T
192 (1963).
17 See supra note 5.
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operation is not the mutilation of the organism, which is always impermissible.
The example may also serve to clarify the distinction I have already made
between the three meanings of "end." In the operation the surgeon does not
think of anything except the skillful removal of the limb of the patient. This
removal is the concrete thing which is willed by him, and one can say that
this act is "the effect willed in itself." But the morality of the act is not determined on this level. Whether the removal of a limb is a health measure or a
mutilation of the patient cannot be recognized in the concrete actuality which
might be photographed. The reason why the surgeon removes the limb must
be looked at. What value does the act seek to serve? It is done because of the
health of the patient. But this by itself does not determine the morality of
the act. A purely good intention in the psychological sense does not determine
the moral goodness of an act. It must be established that this reason is a
commensurate one. If, in the given circumstances, the act is the best possible
solution of the problem in terms of the horizon given by the whole of reality,
it may be said that the act is morally good. In a moral sense, what is then
intended is not the taking of the limb, but the health of the patient. That the
obstacle to be removed was once a useful limb falls in a moral sense outside of
what is intended and is not directly willed. It is another case if the reason
for the removal is not commensuratefor example, if it would be possible
to achieve the objective of health in a way which would cause less loss. The
removal of the limb would then contradict the best possible achievement of
the end. In such a case, in a moral sense the removal of the limb in its
function as member of the body would be directly willed, even if the surgeon
did not direct his attention to this aspect.
In another respect the example is instructive. In the usual thoughtless
dichotomy between physical act and intention any act whatsoever might
be labeled by any intention whatsoever. But this is in reality not even
possible on the psychological, premoral level. Suppose that blood poisoning
could be healed by the injection of a new serum so that the objective of health
would not require removal of the poisoned limb; it would be logically impossible to prefer the limb's removal for the same reason as before the discovery
of the serum. If a physician desired to carry out such an amputation, he
would in fact do it for some other reason, e.g., the avoidance of unusually high
expenses. But as to this new reason the question would again have to be asked:
Is it a commensurate reason or not? In this example it is seen that the permissibility of a medically necessary amputation is not an exception to the prohibition of mutilation, but in a moral sense is an act which is not a removal of the
limb but a healing of the sick.
In a similar way a series of other apparent exceptions to the moral law
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may be clarified. To return to the example of self-defense, the death of an aggressor may be caused if there is no other way to save oneself. Similarly, the
lawfulness of the death penalty in traditional morality has been upheld under
certain circumstances. In this case Thomas himself thinks that the death of

the criminal is directly intended.' 8 I do not agree with his formulation. But
many moralists have followed him in thinking that the commandment, You
shall not kill, is to be understood in a restrictive sense admitting certain exceptions: The guilty may be killed, and an unjust aggressor has already given
up his right to life. This analysis is not persuasive. First, one may repel the
aggression of an insane man although he is incapable of a moral act and
therefore completely incapable of a guilty deed. Conversely, one may not kill
an aggressor, however unjust, if in other ways one can save oneself and other
possible victims. It is false that a criminal condemned to death has no right
to life. How else explain that it is murder if one on his own authority shoots
a man on his way to execution? 19 The execution of the judgment of death
is not direct killing, and so not murder, because there is no other reasonable
possibility of self-defense for the human community. Then the finis operis of
the execution is only the self-defense of the community. I do not thereby
contend that one can be satisfied for all time with this solution. The obligation
remains to seek better solutions within the realm of the reasonably possible.
That in a certain historical situation the death penalty was rightly judged
permissible does not indicate that it remains fundamentally and absolutely
permissible.
If someone in extreme necessity takes the property of another because it
is necessary for him to preserve his life, he does externally what a thief would
do. But a theft is only the taking of the property of another without commensurate reason. A thief wills to enrich himself, but the value of possession
assumes a legal order. Through the violation of this order the thief contradicts
his own end in its existential entirety. The reason for his act is therefore no
longer commensurate. A thief is thus guilty morally of the evil he has caused.
It is different as to the poor man in extreme need for whom there is no other
possibility of saving his life than the taking of the property of another. In order
to be reasonable the legal order which protects property rests on the assumption
that everyone has a right to life. The poor man in extreme need does not
contradict his end, which is the preservation of his life; and he does not
contradict it even in terms of a universal observation (and this point of view
is the decisive one). Therefore he does not will directly that the former
possessor lose his property and suffer injury. It seems to me false to explain
3, at II-II, q.64, a.3 and 7.
See the observations of L. Bender, lus in vita, 30 ANGELICUM 50-62 (1953).

18 THOMAS, op. cit. supra note
'9

PETER KNAUER
this case by asserting that the possessor had no property right in these circumstances to his property, so that he allegedly has suffered no injury.
A lie consists in telling what is false without commensurate reason and
therefore directly or formally causes the error of another; trust is expected and
at the same time subverted. If such behavior were permitted, then trust in its
existential entirety would be impossible; truth could not be shared. But it is
something entirely different if, in order to preserve a secret, a false answer is
given to an indiscreet question. Then the case is parallel with self-defense;
the error of the other is not directly willed. Morally, the answer has the
meaning that I will not give away my secret. That the questioner is deceived
is an evil which is rightly accepted in exchange for preservation of the secret.
I assume, of course, that the question of the other is illegitimate, so that he
has no right to the knowledge of the fact, and I assume that in no other way
can the secret be preserved. In many cases a clearly evasive answer or the
attempt to use ambiguous language, assuming that one has the presence of
mind to think so quickly, is entirely inadequate to protect the secret. In these
circumstances a false answer instead of such language is not the same as a lie.
A concrete example will make my meaning clearer: A family in East
Berlin before the building of the Wall wishes to flee to West Berlin. While
it is gathering some small household effects to take to West Berlin, some
neighbor remarks on its activity and asks, "Is it true that you are going to
West Berlin?" The detection of such preparation for flight carries with
it a serious punishment in prison in East Berlin. How can such a question be
answered? If answer is evaded ("What does this matter to you?"), all is
betrayed. To avoid an answer without betraying the secret, the only course
is to repel with scorn the suspicion of desiring to flee. Such a response in my
opinion has as little to do with lying as the death of an aggressor in the case
of necessary self-defense has to do with murder. On the contrary, it would
be objectively immoral to betray a secret which should rightfully be preserved.
Usually an attempt is made to solve this kind of problem of speech with
a theory as to ambiguous language. But it must be clear that any answer to
an unjustified question, however the answer is phrased, is ambiguous in its
nature in that it may in reality merely refuse to give what the inquirer has
asked. To an illegitimate question any possible answer, contrary to the tenor
of the words used in the answer, may be nothing but a refusal of the correct
answer.
IX. SITUATION ETHICS
SCIENTIFIC ethics has scarcely coped with the preoccupations of so-called
situation ethics. Situation ethics asserts that the moral judgment of an act
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can be given only in the concrete, particular situation; and that a moral
judgment in terms of a general, abstract law, which is valid forever, is impossible. According to this doctrine, ethics ceases to be universally reasonable
or capable of being objectified.
The basis for this approach is the following misunderstanding. It is
thought that the principles of traditional ethics entail substantive statements
and moral qualifications which are then universally applied to particular cases.
In fact, this appearance is given as long as the negative laws (You shall not
kill, You shall not speak an untruth) are not formally understood as prohibitions of what is the direct causation or permission of any given physical evil
not justified by a commensurate reason. In this approach the distinction between physical and moral evil is obscured. Situation ethics then develops,
not unmasking this error, although refusing to accept its consequences.
A moral judgment is naturally possible only when in a concrete act it is
established whether the reason for the act is commensurate or not. On that
depends whether the cause or permission of the associated physical evil is
indirect, or direct and thus morally bad. With this determination the core
of truth in situation ethics is taken into account without destroying the foundation for an objective morality. The answer to the question whether the reason
for an act is commensurate or not depends on rigorous objective criteria and
not on merely subjective or even imaginary good intention.
But another endeavor of saving the core of truth in situation ethics is
erroneous. This is the distinction made between the specific and the individual
lawfulness of an act. For example, according to this distinction, an act of
marital intercourse without love is lawful according to its finis operis and so
is in its species unobjectionable, although it lacks individual lawfulness which
is determined by the finis operantis. Here there recurs in more subtle form
the false distinction between the mere externals of an act as the finis operis
and the inner intention as the finis operantis which I have already criticized.
The finis operis of any act is definable only in relation to an individual intention. An act is only morally good if its reason is commensurate; conversely it
is only bad if the reason of the act is not commensurate. A marital act completed with external correctness, but not intended as the expression of personal
love, is already bad in its finis operis. A special individual ethics is superfluous,
because all true ethics is individual.
In response to what I published earlier on the principle of double effect,
several critics raised the objection that my thesis served the cause of ethical
relativism. This objection is unjust. In what I have asserted up to this point,
I have attempted to demonstrate that the fundamental insights of traditional
ethics show that an act is morally bad if it implies in the last analysis a self-
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contradiction, and thus become unreasonable. This criterion for malum intrinsecum amounts to a universal, unconditional, objective and nonrelative rule.
An immoral act is the seeking of any value in the short run while in its total
existential reality the act destroys the value. The justness of this criterion
cannot be denied by anyone who defends an objective ethics. I believe that
this criterion is precise and not manipulable in any way, and that in using it
I am a clear opponent of situation ethics. But how could my reflections have
given the impression of ethical relativism? The chief reason seems to be that
my critics did not sufficiently observe that the concept of a commensurate
reason must be understood differently than it is commonly and inexactly
understood. It is not my meaning that any act at all is permissible as long
as there is a "serious reason" for it. Such a conclusion would indeed be the
most evil form of ethical relativism. But a commensurate reason in my thesis
is not the same as a serious reason.
A second cause for misunderstanding has been that it is assumed that
certain acts like murder, unchastity, hatred of God, etc., are morally evil in
advance, so that there is nothing more to prove. This is indeed just and true.
If it is once established that the act is murder, then it is established that the
act is morally evil. I put the question at an essentially earlier point: How
can it be recognized that an act is murder? To do this, the physical fact which
could be observed in a photograph does not suffice. As Thomas puts it, "Moral
acts are defined by what is intended in them," or by what is directly willed
in them. 20 I have sought to establish that the concept "direct" correlates with
the concept "commensurate reason." If the concept "direct" is understood
in the sense of direct causality or direct attention of the person who is acting,
then my thesis is understood in a false sense. It would be the worst relativism
if it were seriously asserted that the moral qualification of an act depends on
whether or not the person acting concentrates his attention on the good
intention.
In one sense, however, I plead for a kind of objective relativism in ethics.
I think that there are no prefabricated judgments which can be made, but
that the judgment of conscience depends on what a particular event is in
reality. Whether, for example, particular behavior is hatred of God cannot
be known in advance; it requires examination. It may be that the hatred is
directed to a false image of God which the person refuses to serve. Similarly,
a fool observing the killing of an aggressor could say, "You shall not kill," and
be filled with the prideful consciousness that he spoke his verdict on behalf of
the unchangeable and absolute moral law. He would still have to be told
that the killing was not a direct killing in the sense of the commandment.
20 See supra note 3.
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X.

PROBABILISM

IN OUR discussion of the distinction between affirmative and negative laws of
nature we already saw that what is fundamental is the affirmative obligation
to realize in the best possible way all the values of creation. At the second
level and only as it contradicts its own end is the direct permission or causing
of an evil forbidden. The negative laws are applications of the affirmative
laws in particular cases. Based on an understanding of this relationship probabilism asserts that one may not prevent an act which is possibly good, for
the simple reason that one is not sure whether in fact it is good. As long as
one is not sure that an act is morally bad, it is established that it is perhaps
morally good and the fulfillment of the affirmative obligation to realize the
good may be found in it. Because of the priority of the affirmative obligation
to the good, it would be in the last analysis a lack of responsibility if such an act
were impeded. The tutiorism which is opposed to probabilism is like the
conduct of the servant entrusted with the talent who, for fear of losing it,
buried it and so made no profit.
The moral system of probabilism already contains the principle of double
effect as I have explained it. The simplest example is the one I have already
often cited of a medical decision to be made. The doctor is obliged to determine as far as possible whether the therapy he plans is in fact the best possible;
but a decision can be so pressing that he cannot wait long. The patient would
be dead before the doctor reached the theoretically best medication in the
books. If he could know in advance what would be the best possible measure,
he would be obliged to apply it to the exclusion of all other methods. But in
the actual situation because of the time pressure, the doctor is bound to put
aside the achievement of ideal knowledge and is permitted to use the solution
for the problem which has apparently the least risk and offers a probability
of success. Concretely, he then acts in what is the best possible way considering the matter in its entirety. Care for the health of his patient would not
be a commensurate reason which would justify him in letting time elapse
while he pursued a long investigation. Such behavior would not be responsible. True responsibility is always a function of the best possible choice in
terms of the interrelated whole.
A more general statement is necessary in this connection. In most manuals
the principle of double effect is explained in such a way that it concerns only
the eventual permissibility of permitting or causing a physical evil in the sense
that the act is not expressly forbidden. Exceptions which are justified by
commensurate reasons are not, in fact, something indifferent (a human act
is never indifferent), but are positively good. They are the observance of an
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affirmative law which requires the seeking of a determinate value in the best
possible way. Every act in which any value is sought in a way corresponding
to its existential entirety is eo ipso morally good.
My interpretation of commensurate reason shows that someone can be so
obliged in given circumstances to the causing or permitting of an evil that
there is scarcely any other choice for him. This is the case where any other
act would involve the violation of a negative law. For example, in the case
of catastrophe the rescue of human lives is to be preferred to the salvaging
of valuable goods, unless these on the whole will contribute to the saving
of a greater number of human lives.

XI.

CONTRACEPTION

of the principle of double effect may also contribute to
the solution of the question, so controverted today, as to whether any form
of contraception is permissible. The contribution will consist above all in a
correct formulation of the question itself. In this section I will assume the
results reached above, especially the definition of the concepts "direct" and
"commensurate reason." Whoever reads what follows without reference to
these conclusions and therefore with an inexact understanding of these concepts, runs the danger of misunderstanding the meaning of my assertions.
The teaching of the Church has been expressed as follows by Pius XI:
any form of contraception in any way is immoral, just as lying, theft, and
murder are immoral. It is asked today if this principle is truly general without exceptions. The more severe moralists hold that a modification of the
prohibition is excluded because the Church would have to admit that it had
erred on a fundamental question. Their opponents believe that this is not a
question of infallible teaching and that new arguments which have developed
require reconsideration of the doctrine. These opponents would admit that
in certain cases contraception is permissible. The two approaches stand in
irreconcilable opposition.
The insolubility produced by the problematic seems to me a sign that the
question has been put in a false way. The parties to the discussion seem to
take for granted a single concept of contraception derived from the encyclical
Casti connubii of Pius XI: Contraception is said to be present when the
conjugal act, which by its nature is directed to the procreation of offspring,
is deprived of this natural meaning and power by intention (de industria).
It is evident that not even the most weighty ground (nulla profecto ratio ne
gravissima quidem) can effect that such an act against nature, which is evil
MY INTERPRETATION
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in itself, be permitted. 2 ' This apparently clear and precise determination of
the concept is not inadequate or false on more exact examination, but is
ambiguous.
That a marital act lose its procreative power is a purely physical evil which
does not constitute a human act without further content. Thus Piux XI's
definition of the concept in reference to immoral contraception notes that this
act is done intentionally, de industria. In this concept lies the whole ambiguity. Is de industria meant as intentional in a psychological or in a moral
sense? Let us recall again the example of the medically necessary amputation
of a limb. Psychologically the doctor has the removal of the limb in mind.
One can say in a psychological sense that he in fact de industria removes the
limb from the body. But in a moral sense it is his intention to carry out a
justified operation. Morally the act is not the removal of the limb but a
healing intervention. In a moral sense the act can be justified by a commensurate reason, and the premoral, psychological action is beyond intention;
the doctor's moral intention is to remove a once useful member of the body
only insofar as it is an obstacle to health. If an act has a commensurate reason,
the latter prevents evil from being willed directly or de industria in the moral
sense, so that what psychological attention may be concentrated on is in the
moral sense beyond intention, praeter intentionem. In other words, if the
expression de industria used by Pius XI is understood in a moral sense, it is
demonstrated according to the logic of its use that it is completely the same
as the fundamental moral concepts "direct" or "formal" or "in intention,"
which we have already shown must be conjugated with the concept of commensurate reason.
Like all the negative laws, the prohibition of contraception means the
direct permission or causing of something which must be considered in some
respect a physical evil even if it appears worth being sought in some other
respect. By direct is meant a causing or permission without a commensurate
reason. In a case where there is a commensurate reason for the prevention
of pregnancy, the moral content of the act is not the fact of contraception but
the nature of the commensurate reason. Naturally in making this determination, an absolute distinction must be observed between "commensurate" and
"serious." Pius XI says with complete correctness that, however serious the
reason, it cannot make an act right if it is against nature in the moral sense; the
21 PluS X1, Cajti connubii, AcTA ApOSTOJCaz sais "(hereafter AAS) (1930) 22:559: "At
nulla profecto ratio, ne gravissimra quidem, efficere potest, ut, quod intrinsece est contra naturam, id cum natura congruens et honestum fiat. Cum autem actus coniugii suapte natura
proli generandae sit destinatus, qui, in eo exercendo, naturali hac eum vi atque virtute de industria destituunt, contra naturam agunt et turpe quid atque intrinsece inhonestum
operantur."
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same conclusion is reached in terms of my analysis where a commensurate
reason is lacking.
In ethics, care must be taken not to identify the physical or psychological
order directly with the moral order. A physical evil may be caused or permitted and willed in a psychological sense, and yet the act is not necessarily
a moral evil. It is a moral evil if the act has no commensurate reason but
in its existential entirety contradicts the value sought. It then becomes in a
moral sense contrary to nature. It can be objected that for an act contrary
to nature there is never a reason which can be considered commensurate. But
a conclusion as to commensurate reason logically precedes the determination
that the act is contrary to nature. The objection runs counter to my assertion
that the contrariness to the nature of an act is only recognized when its reason
is not commensurate - that is, when between the act and its proper reason
in terms of the horizon of the entire reality there is a contradiction which shows
that the act is in the last analysis counterproductive.
In ethical discussions a distinction must be made between contraception
in its moral sense as a prevention of pregnancy not justified by a commensurate reason and the premoral concept of actual prevention of a pregnancy.
The second meaning does not yet in a moral sense belong to the finis operis of
the act. If the concept of contraception in the statement of Pius XI is understood in its moral sense, his judgment is correct and by definition permits no
modification. An act which is not founded on a commensurate reason is evil
and remains evil because it is a self-contradiction and in the last analysis
unreasonable, and it is then to be designated according to the evil physically
caused by it - in this case according to the prevention of pregnancy as
contraception.
If de industria is understood not in a moral, but in a psychological sense,
then the judgment of Pius XI is incomprehensible and meaningless as it gives
a moral meaning to a fact understood in a premoral sense. This would be
roughly like determining the color of an object from its weight. On this level
the discussion naturally reaches no conclusion. As long as the distinct meanings of de industria are not separated from each other, every statement must
remain ambiguous even if it is believed to be clear and even if it is solemnly
asserted by ecclesiastical authority.
What I have said up to now on contraception has been of an entirely
formal character. I have not asserted what would be a commensurate reason
because of which the prevention of a pregnancy willed in a psychological sense
would remain beyond moral intention. But, fundamentally, to give such a
reason would be to yield to another false framing of the question which has
been seriously harmful to the discussion. A catalog of commensurate reasons
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is expected in terms of which the act for all time could be regarded as permissible, and it is assumed that there would be no need to consider further
such permissible behavior. These expectations are deceptive. A list of reasons which might be composed, whether they are commensurate or not, cannot be definitively established in advance. What is at issue is a concept which
depends on a relation.
The permissibility of an act, moreover, does not mean that it is permissible
for all time. If a doctor uses a medicine with concomitant evil result, he
remains obliged to use it as long as there is no better means, but he is also
obliged to seek better solutions. Our case is similar. If what is in fact contraceptive conduct in the premoral sense is justified by a commensurate reason
so that it is not an act of contraception in the moral sense, this does not mean
that this reason will remain commensurate forever. There is a fundamental
obligation to seek a solution for the problem which in the achieving of the
values sought accepts in exchange the respectively least evil possible within
the entire range of possibilities.
Many moralists content themselves in their argument with a pure proof
of physical evil. They confuse the physical and the moral sense of contrariness
to nature. This is as though the killing of an aggressor in a case of necessity
were identified with killing in a moral sense. It is, to be sure, true that contrariness to nature in a moral sense has a relation to a physical evil which
can be defined in a physical sense as contrary to nature; but moral evil comes
about only through permission or causing of physical evil without commensurate reason. But this physical evil is not as such a moral evil. The same
moralists found the permission of periodic continence on the logically insufficient claim that periodic continence is not an active attack on procreation
although in fact a choice of times for intercourse is a pure activity. In fact
if periodic continence were practiced without commensurate reason it would
not be other than impermissible contraception. This is plain from the text
of Pius XII.22

22

Cf. Pius XII, Allocution to the Catholic Society of Italian Midwives, October 29, 1951,
AAS (1951) 43:846:
S

. . . sottrarsi sempre e deliberatamente, senza un grave motivo, al suo primario
dovere, sarebbe un peccare contro il senso stesso della vita coniugale.
Da quella prestazione positiva obbligatoria possono esimere, anche per lungo
tempo, anzi per l'intera durata del matrimonio, seri motivi, come quelli che si
hanno non di rado nella cosiddetta "indicazione" medica, eugenica, economica e
sociale. Da cib consegue che l'osservanza dei tempi infecondi pu6 essere ledta sotto
l'aspetto morale; e nelle condizioni menzionate A realmente tale. Se perb non vi
sono, secondo un giudizio ragionevole ed equo, simili gravi ragioni personali o
derivanti dare circostanze esteriori, la volontk di evitare abitualmente la feconditi
della loro unione, pur continuando a soddisfare pienamente la loro sensualiti, non
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The criterion of commensurate reason means that the value whose achievement is realizable only by contraceptive measures in a premoral sense may
not in the last analysis be contradicted by these measures by preventing in the
long run the highest possible realization of this very value with the smallest
possible evil. To prove that a particular act is contraceptive in the moral sense
it must be shown that the act in the last analysis does not serve the end of
preservation and deepening marital love, but in the long run subverts it.
If it is argued in accordance with scholastic ethics that the foundation of
the prohibition of contraception is that the marital act is directed by its nature
to the procreation of offspring, this argument is correct only if it is understood
in a moral sense. The objective of the procreation of offspring is to be sought
in a way commensurate to the objective and not actually subversive of it. It
is conceivable that a marital act may lead to irresponsible procreation. Such
an act would be a sin both against the expected child and against the children
in existence whose appropriate education might not be further provided for.
In this moral sense the act would be one hostile to children, an act which
could be recognized as a misuse of marriage although physiologically everything appeared to be in order. It would appear that this act was in reality
deprived of its natural direction to the procreation of offspring, because there
would be no correspondence between the act and its end in the final analysis
for the moral judgment which must be made in terms of the whole reality.
In this article directed to principles it is not possible for me to enter into
further detail. But the following consequences seem valid. If someone may
not reasonably be responsible for another pregnancy, the use of periodic continence, where it is not impossible because of external circumstances, seems
in the usual case to best correspond to the social and human character of
the marital encounter. With adequate motivation it may serve to increase
mutual love.2 3 Where periodic continence is objectively impossible, the
question is posed whether other ways may be used. These means are to be
judged as to whether or not they contradict the highest possible realization of
the desired value on the whole. If, for example, a man without conscience compelled his wife against her will to have marital intercourse, the wife would
have an evident right to use the necessary means to prevent a pregnancy for
which she cannot take the responsibility. As a wife she would not have to use
pu6 derivare che da un falso apprezzamento della vita e da motivi estranei alle rette
norme etiche.
The expression "serious motive" is somewhat inexact. The real meaning is that of a
commensurate reason as in the passage of Pius XII in the Allocution to the International
Society of Hematologists, Sept. 12, 1958, AAS '(1958) 50:736.
23 Cf. C. Rendu, La rigulation des naissances dans le cadre familial et chritien, 87
NOUVELLE REVUE THEOLOGIQUE 606-31 (1965).
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force against her husband. Her conduct would have nothing in common with
forbidden contraception in a moral sense. It would be a scandalous mistake if
I should be accused because of this position of having abandoned the "hard
but healthy Catholic teaching."
CONCLUSION
PRINCIPLE of double effect brings into usage a criterion which is
implied in every decision of conscience. That an act is good means that a
commensurate reason is recognized as present. Conversely, in an immoral
act a lack of a commensurate reason is recognized - that is, in terms of the
whole reality the act in its existential character directly contradicts the very
value which is intended to be sought. A short-term, particular realization of
a value is sought at the price of a greater loss for the same value as a whole.
This fact is not always clear in advance because a looking back towards the
horizon of reality is necessary. The task of scientific moral theology is to prove
in behavior which is condemned as immoral that it contradicts the very value
which is expressly sought. 2 4 It must be cautioned that the reason for an act
can prove to be commensurate only if the whole horizon is considered and
not some particular aspect. Conscience has to do with the whole.

THE

24 The Editor, whom I thank for the translation of my article, has asked me to answer
this question: Does the principle work also in the sexual area? Take the hypothetical case
often used of a woman who is asked to commit adultery in order that her children may be
rescued from a concentration camp. If her objective is the saving of the children, is her
act contradictory to this objective? Or if a woman for whom prostitution is the only way
to keep from starving, is she not like the man in extreme necessity who steals? Why is
her act any more adultery than his act is theft?
I would reply first that the difficulty is by no means special to the sexual area. We
have the same problem in every kind of extortion or blackmail. For example, someone may
be threatened with death if he refuses to take part in the falsification of a document.
The question must be answered in relation to the whole context. Does life or freedom
have any value if in the end one is forced to give up all human rights and in principle be
exposed to every extortion? This would be in contradiction to the very values of life and
freedom. For extortion always works after the pattern of the salami, one slice of
which is taken after the other: it is a menace not only for a part but also for the whole.
As for the woman who believes that prostitution is the only way to keep from starving,
she is in reality also the victim of extortion. By acceding to an unjust extortion
one can never really save anything in the long run.

